The curse of Rendong holding: Yude department’s huge loss of 140 million

In the early morning of December 24, Rendong holdings was green again. After 13 consecutive days of limit drop and hot money warping, the share price of Rendong holdings was temporarily stabilized in the range of 12-15 yuan. < / P > < p > earlier, the CSRC officially issued the decision on administrative punishment (hereinafter referred to as the “decision”) to Tian Wenjun, the original actual controller of Rendong holdings. The CSRC determined that Tian Wenjun controlled 19 securities accounts and concentrated his capital advantages and shareholding advantages during the period from August 8, 2016 to September 20, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “manipulation period”), used 19 related securities accounts and frequently bought securities The total purchase and sale amount of “Rendong holding” shares sold exceeded 4 billion yuan, resulting in the share price rise of “Rendong holding” far exceeding the Shenzhen composite index. < / P > < p > during the manipulation period, the share price of “Rendong holding” rose by 64.3% (calculated according to the daily closing price of the former recovery rights), while the Shenzhen composite index fell by 21.3% in the same period, with a deviation of 85.6 percentage points, and the financial industry index fell by 30.0% in the same period, with a deviation of 94.3 percentage points. < / P > < p > however, Tian Wenjun didn’t get any profit this time. According to the authoritative calculation of the regulatory agency, as of September 20, 2018, Tian Wenjun’s control account group manipulated “Rendong Holdings” with an actual loss of 140 million yuan. < / P > < p > in addition, Tian Wenjun also holds more than a proportion of the shares of Beixun Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as * ST Beixun) without disclosing information as required and trading in the restricted period. < / P > < p > as soon as the news came out, it immediately aroused widespread concern in the market, and the “entanglement” between Deyu and Rendong holdings came to an end. But the story is not over, after the change of ownership, another “Zhuangzi” event of Rendong holdings came to the surface. < / P > < p > previously, the 21st century economic report reporter found that during the second half of 2019, when the stock price of Rendong holdings began to rise, its executives “lurked” in Chongzuo zhongshuo, a private equity fund, through a multi-layer structure. Since October 2019, the latter began to buy and sell shares of listed companies, which highly coincides with the rising range of the stock price of Rendong holdings without performance support . On December 21, when replying to the inquiry letter of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Rendong holdings admitted that senior executives of the company participated in the capital contribution of Chongzuo zhongshuo, a shareholder. However, the explanation for the delay in disclosing the relationship between Chongzuo zhongshuo and senior executives of the company is that “employees are the main body indirectly holding shares of listed companies, and not directly held by directors and senior executives of listed companies”, which may not make the capital market lose ground I’m convinced. < / P > < p > in the past few days, the share price of Rendong Holdings has been hovering at a low level, the large shareholders have frequently triggered closing transactions, and more than 10000 shareholders have been “sealed at a low level”. Although there is no more information about the specific results of the second round of Rendong holding, the 21st century economic report found that the fall of Rendong holding may have been doomed from the beginning of its listing. In the process of Rendong holding’s “three changes of ownership” and its reduction from shell stock to Zhuang stock, the seeds of risk have already been planted. < p > < p > in 2011, Rendong holdings was listed on the SME Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, but at that time, it was also called Honglei Co., Ltd. It was a manufacturing enterprise engaged in the production and sales of enameled wire, copper tube, copper rod, copper rod, copper accessories, copper crafts and other hardware. < p > < p > before listing, Honglei shares almost doubled every year. From 2008 to 2010, the net profits of Honglei shares attributable to the shareholders of the parent company were 20.519 million yuan, 42.0983 million yuan and 84.7578 million yuan respectively. However, the year after its listing, Honglei’s performance changed dramatically. In 2012, the company’s profit dropped by 62.71% year on year. < / P > < p > in fact, on the eve of the listing, Honglei holdings, the controlling shareholder of the company at that time, was exposed to a debt crisis, with a total debt of 2.5 billion yuan, including a large number of private loans. < p > < p > subsequently, Honglei shares was exposed that the controlling shareholder occupied the interests of the company. In the 2012 annual report of Honglei Co., Ltd., the audit institution issued an audit report with “unqualified opinions with emphasis”, which included the holding shareholder Honglei holdings and its subsidiaries’ receipt of notes receivable of 463 million yuan, the provision of interest on the use of corresponding funds of 11.2 million yuan, and the total occupation of funds of 474 million yuan. < / P > < p > it is obvious that large shareholders treat listed companies as cash machines. In 2013, Shenzhen Stock Exchange denounced Honglei shares, its controlling shareholder, actual controller Qi Jianping and 10 directors, supervisors and senior executives, and three independent directors issued a notice of criticism. < p > < p > in July 2014, Zhejiang Securities Regulatory Bureau required Honglei to make a decision to remove Qi Jianping from the position of chairman, general manager, Secretary of the board of directors and director within 30 working days from the date of receiving this decision. < p > < p > in November 2014, Honglei received the decision letter of administrative punishment from China Securities Regulatory Commission, giving 11 responsible persons such as Qi Jianping, the real controller and chairman of Honglei, a warning and a fine, including a total fine of 670000 yuan. < / P > < p > at the same time, Honglei shares are constantly cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Due to the lack of integration ability or “poor vision”, the goodwill of listed companies soared and their performance continued to deteriorate. In January 2016, Qi Jianping chose to sell her shell. < p > < p > according to the public information, the share transfer agreement between Qi Jianping and Tianjin pomelo assets, Jianhui investment, natural person Jinghua, Yanre industry, etc. transfers the company’s equity to them through the way of agreement transfer, with the transfer price of 27 yuan / share, a total of 120 million shares, accounting for 54.82% of the total share capital of the company. After the transfer, pomelo assets become the actual controller of Honglei shares. < / P > < p > according to the public information, Hao Jiangbo, the legal representative of pomelo assets, whose husband is Tian Wenjun, the founder of Deyu department in Shanxi Province. With the admission of capital player Deyu department, Honglei shares once again fell into the situation of “at the mercy of others”. < / P > < p > since 2014, Deyu company, which is good at capital operation, has been involved in the A-share market. It has successively invested in many listed companies with different subjects such as Longyue industry and Heyou industry. After obtaining the control of the listed companies, it has changed its main business and the name of the listed company through a series of operations such as foreign investment or merger and reorganization, and the company’s stock price soared Then the equity was repeatedly pledged for financing. Beixun group and GuDi technology are the typical cases of their operation. < / P > < p > after taking Honglei shares, Deyu department also carried out a series of operations, aimed at the new hot spot of the market – “financial technology”, and spent 1.4 billion to buy 90% shares of Heli finance, which is engaged in third-party payment. In 2017, Honglei officially changed its name to Minsheng Jinke. On the contrary, the company’s performance is “miserable”. As the first full year of new business development, Minsheng Jinke failed to hand in a satisfactory report card in 2017 as promised, resulting in a series of problems caused by huge losses. According to the 2017 annual report of Minsheng Jinke, the net profit attributable to the shareholders of the listed company in that year was – 216 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 295.31%; the net profit after non deduction was – 214 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 138.3%. The reason for the loss is precisely because the performance of Heli financial is not as expected, and it has withdrawn about 196 million yuan of goodwill impairment. < / P > < p > according to the decision, from April 2016 to January 2018, Tian Wenjun, as the actual controller of Minsheng Jinke, held more than 25% of the total share capital, and had the advantage of holding shares. < / P > < p > during the manipulation period, Tian Wenjun controlled Yang’s account group to buy 53.7168 million shares of “Rendong holding (i.e. Minsheng Jinke, the same below)” with a total purchase amount of 2.155 billion yuan, and sold 74.01 million shares of “Rendong holding” with a total sale amount of 2.018 billion yuan (only considering bidding transactions, not considering block transactions, the same below). Until September 20, 2018, Tian Wenjun controlled Yang’s account group to sell No shareholding at the end of the year. < / P > < p > from the perspective of buying amount, during the manipulation period, there were 143 trading days when Yang’s account group bought “Rendong Holdings” with the amount of more than 1 million yuan, accounting for 43.07% of the actual trading days; 111 trading days when Yang’s account group bought “Rendong Holdings” with the amount of more than 3 million yuan, accounting for 33.43% of the actual trading days; 88 trading days when Yang’s account group bought “Rendong Holdings” with the amount of more than 5 million yuan, accounting for 26.51% of the actual trading days; more than 1, There are 55 trading days for those with 10 million yuan, accounting for 16.57% of the actual trading days; there are 26 trading days for those with more than 20 million yuan, accounting for 7.83% of the actual trading days. On March 28, 2017, the maximum purchase amount was 384 million yuan. < / P > < p > according to the estimation of regulatory authority, as of September 20, 2018, Tian Wenjun’s control account group manipulated “Rendong Holdings” with an actual loss of 140 million yuan. < / P > < p > since 2018, Beixun group, another listed company of Deyu group, has also experienced a large amount of overdue debts and a sharp drop in its share price. After the share price of Beixun group dropped by 96%, it was finally suspended by Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 2020, killing 375 shareholders behind. During the < p > < p > period, Tian Wenjun and Hao Jiangbo, the actual controllers of the Deyu system, went abroad, leaving the shares of the two listed companies and the bank shares held by Longyue and Heyou assets of the Deyu system frozen successively, and many financial institutions began to sue the Deyu company. From August 8 to 10, 2020, Jincheng bank, Jinzhong bank, Yangquan commercial bank and Changzhi bank, which are deeply involved in the debt black hole of the German imperial system, have successively announced that they plan to restructure their assets. < / P > < p > Minsheng Jinke also changed hands again in this storm. Huo Dong, a young “rich second generation” from the “richest” family in Inner Mongolia, came to the stage. < / P > < p > the third change of ownership has created today’s Rendong holdings. Huo Dong changed his name quickly after he became the owner of Minsheng Jinke. In the early days, Huo Dong injected liquidity into the listed company and compensated the listed company for the performance commitment of 140 million yuan in the acquisition of Heli finance. Not only did he not bring substantial changes to the company’s performance, but he made Rendong holdings become the “grave” of many small and medium-sized investors. < / P > < p > in recent years, the Qinghua Group backed by Huo Dong frequently broke out crises. At present, Huo Qinghua and his wife, the actual controllers of Qinghua Group, have been listed as the persons who broke their faith, and the energy of Huo Qinghua family is going from bad to worse. < / P > < p > in April this year, Qinghua Group was listed on the national information network of enterprise bankruptcy and reorganization cases. The last time that Qinghua Group announced its performance was in the first half of 2015. In the current period, the company’s operating revenue fell to 8.702 billion yuan year on year, and the company had a net loss of 437 million yuan. < / P > < p > this change has also led to Huodong’s capital chain becoming more and more tense. While holding a small increase in the shares of listed companies, Huodong is rapidly pledging the company’s shares. By the end of 2019, Rendong information controlled by Huodong and its concerted actor, Rendong Tianjin, have pledged 131 million shares, accounting for 78.44% of the total shares. < / P > < p > at this time of crisis, in July 2019, Rendong holdings suddenly announced that Huo Dong entrusted 21.27% of the voting rights of Rendong holdings to Beijing Haidian Technology Financial Capital Holding Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “haikejin”), a subsidiary of Haidian SASAC, and the actual controller of Rendong holdings was changed to Haidian SASAC for a period of one year. < / P > < p > since then, Rendong Holdings has opened a slow bull market for more than a year. The 21st century business reporter once combed the “entanglement” between Rendong holding and haikejin in the article “the secret path behind the collapse of Rendong holding in the 21st century: shareholders rely on state-owned assets to take advantage of haikejin’s” termination of trusteeship “and the failure of small and medium shareholders. < / P > < p > according to the public information, haikejin is a company with the background of state-owned assets, and it took over the company in August 2018, which had been established at that time